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ABSTRACTS

Infants-Change of Custody
Petitioner Holstein (wife) had been awarded custody of the
children in a divorce action against defendant Holstein (husband).
Defendant Holstein subsequently obtained custody of the children
due to petitioner Holstein's indiscretions. Petitioner Holstein asked
to regain custody of her children on the ground that since they
were taken from her the circumstances of the parties had "materially
changed." The trial court granted her petition. Held, reversed. A
material change in circumstances is not sufficient to award a change
of custody. It must be shown that such change would materially
promote the welfare of the children. Holstein v. Holstein, 160
S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1968).
The dissent by Calhoun, J., in this case appears to be particularly

well-considered. It rests primarily on the general principle that the
discretion of a lower court with respect to changing the custody of
minor children, while subject to review, should not be disturbed
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. This principle is discussed in 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 324 (1959).
The dissent also questions the contention of the majority that
the petitioner must show that the requested change of custody
will materially benefit the children. It is pointed out that this
principle seems to rest ultimately on a series of cases involving a
parent seeking custody of a child whom the parent had voluntarily
surrendered, not a child taken from the parent in an adversary proceeding as was the situation in the instant case. The cases are listed
in Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960).
Negligence.-Leaving Keys in Unattended Vehicle
Defendant Bethea parked his automobile and left his keys in
the ignition, an act prohibited by South Carolina statutory law. The
automobile was stolen and the thief negligently collided with plaintiff
Stone's car. Stone brought an action against Bethea, the car owner,
to recover for injuries sustained in the collision. The trial court
granted the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict. Held,
affirmed. The leaving of his keys in the car by Bethea was not
the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Stone
v. Bethea, 161 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1968).
W. VA. COw. ch. 17C, art. 14, § 1 (Michie 1966), is similar to the
South Carolina statute considered in the principal case. That West
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